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After seven years of negotiations, participants at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)  mini-ministerial 
meeting in Geneva last July could not reach a final 
agreement on the Doha Round liberalization modalities. 
Conflicts still exist regarding the commitments that both 
developed and developing countries should make. For 
instance, the United States is still reluctant to tackle the 
issue of domestic support to the cotton sector, and India 
and other developing countries wish to avoid restrictions 
(such as the anti-concentration clause) on their ability to 
use flexibility in non-agricultural liberalization.
Beyond these very specific elements of disagreement, 
it seems that the incentives to conclude the Doha Round 
are weak. Because large market access gains have already 
been achieved in the manufacturing sectors of developed 
country markets, the impetus for previous multilateral 
negotiations has vanished. In addition, the remaining issues 
are not only more difficult to negotiate, but the political 
costs are higher and the gains are less easy to assess.  
For developed countries, liberalizing their agricultural 
markets remains a very complex issue. At the same 
time, developing countries want to maintain protection 
in manufacturing and avoid making new commitments 
regarding services based on nascent industry 
considerations. Lastly, regional and bilateral liberalizations 
have reduced the market access gains expected by key 
players and have fostered resistance to multilateral 
liberalization that will erode existing preferences. 
Therefore, the longer the negotiations last, the weaker is 
the incentive to conclude a successful round.
In parallel, impact assessments using a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model have provided 
increasingly accurate quantitative information concerning 
the gains and losses associated with the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). Great improvements have 
been achieved since the Uruguay Round assessment, where 
a lack of information on tariffs led to an overestimation 
of potential gains. However, improved information has 
shown that the gains of the Doha Round have decreased 
since the models now capture the fact that applied 
tariffs are in most cases lower than their Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) bound level, due to both binding overhang 
(the gap between MFN bound and applied rates) and 
preferences (the gap between MFN and bilateral applied 
rates). In addition, the implementation of trade scenarios 
has become more and more precise, adding details and 
including the numerous flexibilities and exceptions that 
exist, limiting per se the scope of liberalization. 
i
n times of economic turmoil, countries might decide to increase current tariff rates to 
protect domestic industries or raise revenues in order to finance domestic programs. using 
the highest applied or bound rate imposed by countries from 1995 to 2008 as an indicator, 
this study presents several scenarios regarding the economic costs of a failed doha Round 
and a subsequent rush into protectionism. for example, in a scenario where the applied 
tariffs of major economies would go all the way up to currently bound tariff rates, world trade 
would decrease by 7.7 percent. in a more modest scenario where countries would raise tariffs 
to maximum rates applied during the past 13 years, world trade would decrease by 3.2 percent. 
These increases in duties would reduce world welfare by us$353 billion under the first scenario, 
and by us$134 billion under the more modest scenario. While such an increase in duties would 
particularly impact agricultural exports (–6.9 percent), especially in developing countries 
(–11.5 percent), exports of industrial goods could also face a substantial reduction: 2 percent in 
developed countries and 4.8 percent in developing countries. This study concludes there would 
be a potential loss of us$1,064 billion in world trade if world leaders were to fail to conclude the 
doha development Round of trade negotiations in the next few weeks and if countries were to 
implement subsequently protectionist policies, as occurred after the end of the uruguay Round.  
The failure of the negotiations would prevent a us$336 billion increase in world trade that 
would have come from a reduction in tariffs and domestic support, while a worldwide resort to 
protectionism would contract world trade by us$728 billion.The shrinking gains associated with the Doha Round 
have led both economists and policymakers to state that 
the real gains go far beyond tariff-reduction effects and can 
be found outside the standard model. For example, gains 
in productivity, the liberalization of services, and trade 
facilitation are still weakly represented in CGE exercises, 
but may account for a large share of the positive effects 
of a successful round. Moreover, even if applied tariffs are 
not cut, the simple fact that tariff lines are bound and that 
the existing binding overhang is reduced has significant 
value because it provides a stable trade environment. The 
goal of this study is not to uncover additional benefits 
associated with the DDA, but to re-examine the value of 
an agreement by considering potential gains and losses in 
a moving landscape of trade policies.
Traditional impact studies have assessed the potential 
gains of the Doha negotiations by comparing the 
consequences of the negotiation modalities to the status 
quo (baseline). Therefore, the cost of failed negotiations is 
just an opportunity cost representing the unrealized gains. 
However, this approach may underestimate the real losses 
associated with a failure of the DDA. Such a drastic event 
will make the business-as-usual assumption uncertain 
since the status quo is not a long-term perspective for 
trade policies. The current trend of multilateral trade 
liberalization may not survive this failure, and the global 
public good provided by the WTO that helps to free trade 
in a stable and less-distorted environment may vanish. 
Therefore, this study compares the effects of a DDA 
scenario with other relevant alternatives.
First, the threat of trade wars will escalate. The 
number of litigations at the WTO will increase, and 
countries may try to reverse past unilateral trade 
liberalization moves. 
Second, the current financial crisis may foster 
protectionist behavior, as occurred after the October 
1929 crisis.  A parallel can easily be drawn between the 
current situation and the one that existed then; in early 
1930, unemployment was also rising, fears of deflation 
were prevailing, and a lack of public resources (which was 
more pronounced in countries that paid war reparations) 
prevented governments from remedying the economic 
crisis. Moreover, today as in 1930, the context of 
decreasing prices can mechanically reinforce protection, as 
specific duties (defined as monetary amounts by physical 
units), which are numerous in agriculture, become more 
and more restrictive when world prices are down. In this 
type of economic context, protectionism is a tempting 
policy instrument for policymakers—it short-sightedly 
increases domestic prices and supports domestic activity, 
and it provides new public receipts. Finally, governments 
do not correctly anticipate world retaliation and counter-
retaliation, as was the case with the United States in 
1930 and also last year when, in the middle of the food 
crisis, governments implemented export bans and export 
restrictions in successive rounds of retaliation and 
counter-retaliation. 
Third, since the failure of the DDA will mainly be due 
to disagreements between rich and emerging countries, 
the main trade powers will promote their market access 
interests by negotiating new free trade areas (FTAs) with 
key partners. So, depending on the success or failure of 
the DDA, the trade policy dynamics will strongly differ. 
However, defining a baseline other than the status-quo 
is a challenging task. It is difficult to guess the reaction of 
different countries in a non-cooperative world.
AlternAtive   scenarios
The five scenarios analyzed here include the Doha 
compromise of July 2008 and four alternatives driven by 
the failure of the negotiations (see Box 1).
doha scenario
The first scenario represents a successful Doha outcome 
based on July 2008 modalities. After seven years of trade 
talks, market access modalities have reached a high 
level of sophistication. Even if the general philosophy 
is simple, with progressive tariff-cut formulas for both 
agricultural and nonagricultural goods, many flexibilities 
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doha: July 2008 modalities
up to Bound: Non-FTA applied tariffs increased 
to existing bound level.
up to Max: Non-FTA applied tariffs increased 
to their last 13 years maximum level, capped by 
existing bound tariffs.
fTa-hiCs: An FTA covering 95 percent of 
tariff lines is implanted between High-Income 
Countries.
fTa-hiCs + up to Max: Combination of Up to 
Max and FTA-HIC scenarios.
Box 1—sCenaRioshave been introduced with different degrees of special and 
differential treatment for different groups of developing 
countries. This scenario implements all the details of these 
modalities in terms of market access as well as a duty-
free-quota-free market access initiative for least-developed 
countries (LDCs) and OECD countries (excluding South 
Korea but including Mexico and Turkey). It authorizes a 
3-percent exemption clause in terms of products. Export 
subsidies are phased out by 2013 for developed countries. 
Concerning domestic support, this scenario includes the 
overall constraint on Overall Trade Distorting Support 
(OTDS) for the United States and the European Union 
(EU). Due to the complexity of integrating other elements 
of the DDA agenda in the simulations, other sources 
of potential gains are omitted, such as liberalization in 
services, WTO rules, trade facilitation and intellectual 
property rights.
up to Bound scenario
If the DDA fails, two scenarios are analyzed: an upward 
protectionist trend and a push for regional agreements 
between countries eager to reach freer trade. The first 
option, the Up to Bound scenario, examines the possibility 
for WTO countries to increase their tariffs up to their 
Uruguay Round (UR) bound level in a five-year period 
(2009–2014). It assumes that the entire binding overhang 
will be eliminated. For unbound lines, the existing average 
binding overhang is applied to compute new tariffs. This 
scenario represents a strong increase in protection 
by eliminating all unilateral liberalization but does not 
represent an open trade war between WTO members. 
Existing commitments are still respected. This scenario 
may appear extreme since many developing countries 
bound their tariffs during the UR using a ceiling option to 
levels that they have never and will never apply. Moreover, 
countries have decided to apply zero tariffs on a large 
selection of raw materials and imported input even if the 
existing bound tariffs are strictly positive. 
up to Max scenario 
To adopt a more realistic scenario, historical data were 
used to determine the highest applied protection rate 
implemented by every country during 1995–2006. Then, 
the minimum between the historical maximum level 
and existing bound tariffs was selected. This Up to Max 
scenario corresponds to a case whereby governments 
apply the more adverse trade policies of the past  
13 years but still respect their UR commitments. On 
an historical basis, tariffs evolve to answer changes in 
world prices, domestic production structure, and political 
pressures. This scenario allows the share of binding 
overhang that is really relevant for private agents to be 
captured since it corresponds to the behavior exhibited 
by policymakers since the end of the UR. It is important 
to note that in both scenarios (Up to Bound and Up to 
Max), the preferential tariffs protected by bilateral or 
regional agreements are not changed. Only MFN applied 
rates and non-reciprocal preferential rates are modified. 
The only non-reciprocal program that is maintained is 
the EU “Everything but Arms” initiative due to the way 
this program has been implemented and renewed in the 
EU legislation. Up to Bound is not the worst scenario that 
can be anticipated; many countries have not yet bound 
their import tariffs and are not today constrained by any 
upward limitation. Anti-dumping duties and safeguard 
mechanisms can be activated and can restrict trade even 
in rich countries where binding overhang is nil or limited.
fTa-hiCs scenario
Another effect of failed Doha negotiations is that 
countries would be more likely to seek market access 
gains through bilateral or plurilateral agreements. It is 
possible to imagine a multiplication of FTAs that would 
worsen the already existing spaghetti bowl and increase 
trade costs due to a lack of transparency and the 
complexity of overlapping rules of origin. However, this 
study focuses on the implementation of one plurilateral 
agreement (the FTA-HICs scenario). It assumes that 
HICs will adopt a zero-for-zero approach whereby each 
member of the plurilateral agreement will liberalize  
95 percent of its tariff lines. Several considerations 
justify this choice. First, North-South and South-South 
negotiations are still difficult to conduct, are often delayed 
and, in the case of the latter, are weakly enforced. Second, 
HICs will place the responsibility for the failure of DDA 
on the MICs’ lack of commitment to open their own 
markets. In reaction, they may decide to move more 
quickly toward freer trade with countries ready to do this. 
Finally, by implementing a 95-percent duty-free agreement, 
rich countries will still be consistent with GATT article 
XXIV and will protect their sensitive sectors, especially 
agriculture.  At the same time, an FTA will not entail 
commitments regarding export subsidies and domestic 















Source: MAcMapHS6v2.1, TRAINS and authors’ calculations (reference group weighting scheme).
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figure 1—World average Tariffs by scenario (2025 level)
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fTa-hiCs + up to Max scenario
The last scenario, FTA-HICs + Up to Max, is a combination 
of two scenarios: a rise of protection to past levels and 
the implementation of an HIC FTA.  An HIC FTA will lead 
to increased differences between insiders and outsiders 
and will drive trade blocks to retaliate. Thus, the FTA-HIC + 
Up to Max scenario may represent the stage after the FTA-
HIC scenario.
Consequences
Figure 1 displays the consequences of these five scenarios 
on average world tariffs. The Doha scenario will reduce 
world protection by 22 percent, from 4.6 percent to  
3.6 percent. Moving to bound tariffs (Up to Bound 
scenario) will double the level of protection on average. 
The elimination of recent unilateral tariff reduction 
enacted during the past 13 years (Up to Max scenario) 
has a more limited impact but still represents an increase 
of 40 percent in world tariffs compared to the baseline 
(from 4.6 percent to 6.4 percent). Even with its limited 
geographical scope, the implementation of the FTA-HICs 
scenario still has an impact on world-level protection 
since it concerns important economic zones—in 
particular, trade inside the Quad (United States, Canada, 
EU, and Japan). This FTA will exclude many agricultural 
products and therefore, the average rate of tariff cut in the 
FTA-HICs scenario is lower for agriculture (5 percent) than 
for non-agricultural products (11 percent).   doha  up to Bound  up to Max  up to Max + fTa-hiCs  fTa-hiCs 
World exports(a)(b)   1.46   –7.70   –3.16   –2.63   0.40 
  Agro-food  4.03   –14.82   –6.86   –6.29  0.40 
   Industry  1.50   –7.45   –3.19   –2.59   0.46 
World Welfare   0.09   –0.51   –0.19   –0.19   0.01 
  North  0.07   –0.32   –0.14   –0.12   0.02 
   South  0.13   –1.00   –0.32   –0.35   –0.02 
World exports(a)(b)   336   –1774   –728   –605   92 
  Agro-food  68   –251   –116   –107    7
  Industry  256   –1272   –545   –442   79
World Welfare   59   –353   –134   –128   4 
  North  34   –159   –71   –60   8 
   South  25  –194  –63  –68  –4
(a) including eu-Trade.    (b) including services.
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Table 1 displays the results of protection faced by 
exports and applied on imports by group of countries. The 
Doha scenario will cut the applied protection by one-third 
for HICs and one-tenth for MICs, a significant achievement 
when compared to previous GATT rounds. It will also lock 
existing market access due to unilateral liberalization on  
a MFN or nonreciprocal preferences basis. Indeed, under 
the Up to Bound scenario, protection could increase by  
50 percent in HICs, 130 percent in MICs, and 270 percent 
in LDCs compared to the current level. Under the Up to 
the Max scenario, protection will increase by 23 percent, 
56 percent, and 67 percent, respectively, in these three 
groups of countries. Interestingly, for the HICs, the 
combination of the FTA and the raise in tariffs applied 
to other countries to past observed levels (FTA-HICs + 
Up to Max scenario) keeps the average level of applied 
protection unchanged.
It is noteworthy to examine which group of countries 
is the more severely impacted by these scenarios. In 
relative terms, the Doha scenario manages to deliver 
homogeneous market access gains with an average 
decrease of about 20 percent of the tariffs faced by the 
  hiCs  MiCs  ldCs  hiCs  MiCs  ldCs 
Baseline   4.6  4.6  4.0  3.0  8.6  9.8
doha   3.6  3.6  3.2  1.9  7.8  9.8
up to Bound   9.0  8.9  11.7  4.4  19.8  36.1
up to Max   6.5  6.3  7.3  3.7  13.3  16.3
fTa-hiC + up to Max   5.6  6.3  7.3  2.9  13.3  16.3
fTa-hiC   3.9  4.6  4.0  2.4  8.6  9.8
source: MacMaphs6v2.1, TRains, and authors’ calculations (reference group weighting scheme).
note: hiCs stands for high-income Countries, MiCs for Middle-income Countries, and ldCs for least-developed Countries.
  PRoTeCTion faCed (%)  PRoTeCTion  aPPlied (%)
Table 1—Protection by category of countries
PeRCenTage Changes
Table 2—global results led by tariffs and domestic support changes—Change compared to the baseline in 2025
Value Changes ($Bn – 2004 ConsTanT us$)Tariff reform is implemented at the disaggregation level of the MacMap-HS6v2.1 database with tariff data for 
2004 (including 5,113 products, 170 importing countries, and 208 exporting countries). The analysis accounts 
for all major changes that occurred up to 2008, including major regional trade agreements (RTA), new WTO 
members (such as Ukraine), and so on. The TRAINS database was used to investigate the tariff changes 
since 1995, and a special procedure was created to ensure comparability between MacMap and TRAINS. The 
political economy model developed by Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2008) was used when sensitive products 
had to be selected for implementing tariff scenarios (such as agricultural and non-agricultural DDA modalities, 
DFQF initiative, 5-percent exclusion in the FTA HICs scenario). Finally, when WTO members liberalize under 
the DDA, the market access remains unchanged for non-WTO members.
The tariff scenarios are then implemented in the MIRAGE (Modeling International Relationships in 
Applied General Equilibrium) model, developed initially at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) in Paris. Based on standard and robust assumptions, it should be noted that the 
model may underestimate the positive effects of trade reform, particularly when such reform drives new 
investments, technology improvements, or important trade or production diversification.
Macroeconomic data (such as world trade flows, production, consumption, and intermediate use of 
commodities and services) come from the GTAP 7 database. The modeling exercise assumes perfect 
competition. Twenty-seven regions are identified in the model (8 high-income regions), which maps the main 
trade blocks. The sectoral decomposition is highly detailed in terms of agriculture and agrifood business 
(with 12 sectors), since most of the protection faced is in this sector. All other sectors are non-agricultural, 
including 13 industrial sectors and 2 service sectors. 
A baseline is implemented from 2008 to 2025, which depicts the world without a new multilateral 
agreement. Concerning trade reform, the following agreements since 2004 have been included in the baseline: 
•  Achievement of a complete FTA for ASEAN, CEMAC, COMESA, and SADC ECOWAS;
•  EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements
•  Implementation of the EU-India, EU-ASEAN, US-Colombia, US-Oman, US-Bahrain, US-Morocco, US-
Australia, Mercosur-Colombia, and China-Chile FTAs.
This baseline serves as a point of comparison with all the scenarios. The results are reported for the year 




three groups of countries (from 4.6 percent to 3.6 percent 
for both HIC and MIC countries, and from 4.0 to  
3.2 percent for LDCs). The other scenarios, however, have 
significantly different results. Though the two protectionist 
scenarios have similar effects for HICs and MICs  
(90 percent+ for Up to Bound and 40 percent for Up to 
Max), the LDCs are more severely affected due to the 
losses of nonreciprocal preferences. Of course, the FTA-
HICs scenario only benefits HIC countries (a 14-percent 
decrease in faced protection) but less than the DDA 
scenario does.
economic   impacts 
The MIRAGE CGE model was used to assess the 
economic impacts of these different tariff and domestic 
support scenarios (see methodology in Box 2). Table 2 
indicates the global results of all scenarios for the world 
economy in 2025, compared to baseline.
Under the Doha scenario considered here, and 
focusing on only a part of the rich DDA agenda (the tariff 
liberalization and domestic support discipline), world trade 
is augmented by a mere 1.46 percent (US$336 billion) 
and world real income by US$59 billion in 2025. However, 
these numbers are driven by the assumption that no inTeRnaTional food PoliCy ReseaRCh insTiTuTe  www.ifpri.org
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major political shock will take place if the DDA is not 
signed; such an assumption should be considered carefully. 
In case of the Up to Bound scenario, world trade would 
contract by 7.7 percent (–US$1,774 billion) and world real 
income by US$353 billion. In the case of the less damaging 
Up to Max scenario, world trade would be reduced less, by 
3.2 percent (–US$728 billion). While such an increase in 
duties would especially impact agricultural exports  
(–6.9 percent), particularly harming developing countries’ 
agricultural exports (–11.5 percent), the exports of indus-
trial goods could also face a substantial reduction—2 per-
cent in developed countries and 4.8 percent in developing 
countries. While only tariffs on goods would be increased, 
trade in services will also be affected in countries that  
decide to tighten trade policy in these services.
It is important to note that the establishment of an 
HIC free trade zone would only increase world trade by 
0.4 percent since this agreement would remove tariff bar-
riers between countries already close to free trade while 
allowing them to exempt 5 percent of highly protected 
products from this process. This is not a major shock for 
world trade as compared to protectionist scenarios or 
the failure of the DDA. Due to the trade diversion effect, 
developing countries will be negatively affected by an HIC 
FTA (–0.02 percent of their real income) while developed 
countries will benefit from such an agreement (+0.02 per-
cent of their real income). When combined with the Up To 
Max scenario, the HIC FTA would not prevent a contrac-
tion of world trade, which decreases by 2.63 percent. 
These figures allow for a clear reassessment of what 
is really at stake. A disagreement between WTO countries 
over the DDA would signal international non-cooperation. 
If those countries subsequently implement protectionist 
policies, the loss could be much greater. In a CGE model 
like MIRAGE, scenarios are not additive, so it is not strictly 
consistent to add up gains and losses. But this exercise 
clearly gives a first approximation of what could be lost by 
the failure of the DDA. A simple calculation measures the 
potential loss in world trade at US$1,064 billion: the failure 
of the DDA would not only prevent a US$336 billion 
increase in world trade coming from new commitments 
on tariffs, but a worldwide move toward protectionism 
would contract world trade by US$728 billion. If trade 
among EU27 members is excluded, this figure reaches 
US$1,140 billion. Moreover, the DDA will not only 
increase trade, it will also reinforce binding commitments 
and reduce existing bound duties. In so doing, it will play 
its international public good role by making the trade 
environment more secure and decreasing the costs 
associated with potential trade wars.
conclusion
Recent studies assessing the potential impact of the DDA 
have concluded there would be modest augmentation in 
world trade and world real income. This study, which is 
limited to tariffs and domestic support discipline, does not 
invalidate this conclusion, but examines the situation from 
a completely different perspective. The failure of a WTO 
agreement would be a clear sign of international noncoop-
eration; it would launch trade conflicts and litigations (es-
pecially between High-Income and Developing Countries) 
and would be the first unsuccessful Round despite the fact 
that it is the first Round to focus on development and the 
first Round launched by the WTO. In a period of economic 
stagnation, the risk is high that this failure would give WTO 
members the incentive to pursue non-cooperative strate-
gies via the adoption of protectionist policies. In that case, 
the loss would be much greater than a mere US$79 billion. 
This study concludes there would be a potential loss of at 
least US$1,064 billion in world trade if world leaders were 
to fail to conclude the Doha Development Round of trade 
negotiations in the next few weeks and if countries were 
to implement subsequently protectionist policies, as was 
observed after the end of the Uruguay Round. Thus, the 
stakes in Geneva are very high and the July 2008 package 
appears to be the closest and most promising step toward 
a global development agenda for a world in turmoil. 